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ABSTRACT 
The United States and Canada may be friends and allies, but the two 
countries’ approaches to the regulation of marijuana agriculture have 
not evolved in tandem. On the contrary, their respective paths toward 
legalization and regulation of marijuana agriculture are remarkably 
divergent. In the United States, where marijuana remains a federally 
prohibited and tightly-controlled substance, legalization and regulation 
have remained the province of state legislatures and their administrative 
agencies for decades. In Canada, a succession of court cases paving the 
way toward medicinal marijuana use has prompted the federal 
government to develop a national framework committed to “legalize, 
regulate, and restrict access” to marijuana. 
Many jurisdictions attempting to regulate (or exploring the possibility of 
regulating) the marijuana industry struggle to address the first step in 
the supply chain—agriculture. This essay will compare and contrast the 
experiences of the United States and Canada in the regulation of 
marijuana agriculture. It is evident that there is more than one 
regulatory approach that can provide a safe and sustainable product to 
consumers while promoting equity among farmers. Nonetheless, the 
trials and tribulations of pioneering governments can illuminate the 
pitfalls, consequences, and drawbacks policymakers are likely to 
encounter in the future. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Federal marijuana policy in the United States and Canada has, in recent 
decades, been fixated on prohibition. That may be about to change. In 2017, 
Canada is expected to become the first ‘Group of Seven’ nation to propose 
legislation that would legalize and regulate marijuana for recreational use.1 
According to the Canadian government’s party platform, “marijuana prohibition 
does not work.”2 In a change of direction from decades of prohibition, the 
government is now calling for Parliament to “legalize, regulate, and restrict 
access to marijuana.”3 Importantly, policymakers and regulators are in the 
process of developing a federal framework for marijuana regulation that would 
 
1. AFP, Canada to Legalize Recreational Marijuana by Mid-2018: Report, YAHOO! (Mar. 26, 2017), 
https://www.yahoo.com/news/canada-legalize-recreational-marijuana-mid-2018-report-145852604.html (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
2. Marijuana, LIBERAL PARTY OF CANADA, goo.gl/WK8im6 (last visited July  22, 2017) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review).  
3. Id.  
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address agricultural considerations, including environmental impacts and 
protections for small-scale farmers.4 
The mood of the United States federal government is a marked contrast. 
Marijuana has been a federally criminalized substance since passage of the 
Controlled Substances Act in 1970.5 Following the 2016 presidential elections, 
there is uncertainty regarding President Donald Trump’s stance toward marijuana 
legalization and regulation on the state level.6 However, early indications suggest 
his administration is not interested in a federal regulatory framework.7 Although 
the Republican Party in control of the federal government generally supports 
federalism principles and state autonomy, there is fear that the federal 
government will interfere with state marijuana legalization and regulation 
efforts.8 Absent a regulatory framework that goes beyond prohibition, there is 
little hope for federal involvement in agricultural or environmental issues facing 
the marijuana industry. 
In addition to this contrast on the federal level, the United States and Canada 
have divergent experiences when it comes to subnational marijuana legalization 
and regulation. In the United States, marijuana legalization has gained 
momentum and become commonplace on the state level. California became the 
first state to legalize medical marijuana use in 1996.9 Colorado and Washington 
then became the first states to legalize recreational marijuana use in 2012.10 At 
the time of writing, twenty-eight states had legalized medical marijuana, while 
eight states (plus the District of Columbia) had legalized recreational marijuana.11 
 
4. See A Framework for the Legalization and Regulation of Cannabis in Canada: The Final Report of the 
Task Force on Cannabis Legalization and Regulation, HEALTH CANADA (Dec. 2016), http://healthy 
canadians.gc.ca/task-force-marijuana-groupe-etude/framework-cadre/index-eng.php (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review).  
5. Collin B. Walsh & Daniel T. Nau, The History, Law, and Psychology of Criminalizing Marijuana: A 
Comparative Analysis with Alcohol and Tobacco, 274 INDIANA LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES 23 (2013). 
6.  John Schroyer, Bart Schaneman & Omar Sacirbey, Legal Uncertainty for Marijuana Industry after 
Trump Election, Conference Panelists Say, MARIJUANA BUSINESS DAILY (Nov. 17, 2016), 
https://goo.gl/hz5GEs (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
7.  Current U.S. Attorney General, tasked with enforcing the nation’s federal laws, stated as Senator of 
Alabama, “Good people don’t smoke marijuana.” Sean Cockerham, Congress’ Cannabis Caucus Ready to 
‘Bump Heads’ with Anti-pot Trump Attorney General, MCCLATCHY DC BUREAU (Feb. 16, 2017, 6:29 PM), 
https://goo.gl/oqrarB (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
8.  Id. 
9.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (Westlaw 2017); Adam Cohen, California's Prop 19: 
Leading the Way to Pot Legalization, Time (Oct. 6, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/ 
0,8599,2023860,00.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
10.  Colo. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 (2012) (Colorado constitutional amendment 64); Wash. Initiative 
Measure No. 502 (2012); Maia Szalavitz, Two U.S. States Become First to Legalize Marijuana, TIME (Nov. 7, 
2012), http://healthland.time.com/2012/11/07/two-u-s-states-become-first-to-legalize-marijuana/ (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
11. 29 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, PROCON.ORG (last visited Apr. 2, 2017), 
https://goo.gl/7XV2kr (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Marijuana Overview, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (April 3, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-
justice/marijuana-overview.aspx (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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Only four states have maintained a strict prohibition policy on marijuana 
cultivation, distribution, sale, or consumption.12 These states represent less than 
five percent of the U.S. population.13 Despite the federal prohibition, there are 
now a multitude of state regulatory frameworks in place, with a variety of 
statutory goals and approaches to compare. 
Canada has not experienced the same subnationally-driven path toward 
legalization. Instead, the erosion of prohibition has been driven largely by the 
courts. Regina v. Parker, 49 O.R. (3rd) 481 [2000], set the stage for legalization 
by declaring the federal government’s marijuana prohibition unconstitutional 
absent an exemption for medical necessity.14 As the Court stated, “[t]he 
marijuana laws forced the accused to choose between commission of a crime to 
obtain effective medical treatment and inadequate treatment,” a deprivation of 
liberty, security, and fundamental justice.15 Invalidating the marijuana prohibition 
forced the Canadian Parliament to develop at least a basic framework for medical 
marijuana use.16 Although the development of subsequent regulatory frameworks 
has been inconsistent, Canada’s experience with marijuana regulation on the 
federal level can serve as a meaningful starting point with which to pursue 
recreational legalization and regulation. 
A more developed exploration of U.S. and Canadian experiences with 
marijuana legalization and regulation is provided in the next section. However, 
this essay’s primary focus is on the contrasting experiences of these two 
countries with respect to marijuana agriculture.17 The agricultural component of 
the marijuana industry is, after all, where the chain of supply begins. And yet, the 
need for thoughtful and realistic agricultural regulations often takes a back seat to 
more visible concerns, such as distribution, marketing, sale, and consumption. 
The lack of attention paid to marijuana cultivation is a disservice to farmers, 
regulators, and consumers. Farmers often confront ambiguous or unresponsive 
legal requirements, and are forced to choose between staying in the shadows of 
 
12. By “strict prohibition policy,” I mean states that have passed neither decriminalization laws nor allow 
for non-psychoactive marijuana consumption for medical purposes. These states are Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, 
South Dakota, and West Virginia. Marijuana Overview, supra note 11; State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 7, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-
marijuana-laws.aspx (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
13. According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s July 2016 estimates, the combined population of Idaho, 
Indiana, Kansas, and South Dakota is 12,088,936. The estimated population of the United States is 323,127,513. 
Population Estimates, July 1, 2016, (V2016), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://goo.gl/zlyP5G (last visited July 20, 
2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
14. Regina v. Parker (2000), 49 O.R. 3d 481 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
15. Id. at ¶ 7–9. 
16. See, Marihuana for Medical Purposes Regulations, Repealed SOR/2013-230 (Can.). 
17. This essay draws from, and builds on, the author’s previous work on marijuana agriculture regulation. 
See Ryan B. Stoa, Weed and Water Law: Regulating Legal Marijuana, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 565 (2016); Ryan B. 
Stoa, Marijuana Agriculture Law: Regulation at the Root of an Industry, 69(2) FLORIDA L. REV. (forthcoming, 
2017); Ryan B. Stoa, Marijuana Appellations: The Case for Cannabicultural Designations of Origin, 11(1) 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2017).  
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the illicit market or attempting to comply with a confusing web of unrealistic 
regulations. Policymakers and administrative agencies face their own challenge: 
tasked with creating an ambitious regulatory framework from scratch. These 
regulators often do not have a history with the marijuana industry, or analogous 
regulations to fall back on. Consumers and the public at large, finally, benefit 
from having a diversity of market options, as well as marijuana that is sustainably 
cultivated. 
The early record of marijuana agriculture regulation in the U.S. and Canada 
is mixed. Some U.S. states, such as California, acknowledge the agricultural 
component of the marijuana industry and are taking steps to develop a regulatory 
framework that supports farming communities and the environment.18 Other 
states, such as New York and Florida, aim to control cultivation by severely 
limiting the number of producers.19 In any case, most states have not developed a 
robust regulatory scheme for marijuana that comprehensively addresses 
agricultural issues. 
Canada’s approach to marijuana agriculture regulation has been 
simultaneously restrictive and permissive under the current medically-focused 
framework. On the one hand, Health Canada (authorized to regulate cultivation) 
has only issued fifty cultivation licenses nation-wide,20 despite receiving 1,665 
applications.21 Nine Canadian provinces have two cultivators or less.22 In 
addition, marijuana can only be grown indoors,23 an energy-intensive agricultural 
method that artificially reproduces the light, soil, and water conditions found on 
outdoor farms. On the other hand, licensed cultivators are allowed to develop, 
grow, and sell whatever strain(s) of marijuana they see fit, and are free to set 
their own prices.24 
In anticipation of legislation that would legalize and regulate recreational 
marijuana in Canada, the federal government formed a task force to make 
recommendations on marijuana policy.25 The task force report recommended 
 
18. Infra Part III. 
19. Id. 
20. Authorized Licensed Producers of Cannabis for Medical Purposes, GOV’T OF CAN., 
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/medical-use-marijuana/licensed-
producers/authorized-licensed-producers-medical-purposes.html (last visited July 22, 2017) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
21. Application Process: Becoming a Licensed Producer of Cannabis for Medical Purposes, GOV’T OF 
CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/medical-use-marijuana/licensed-
producers/application-process-becoming-licensed-producer.html (last visited July 22, 2017) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
22. Authorized Licensed Producers of Cannabis for Medical Purposes, supra note 20. Five provinces 
have no licensed cultivators.  
23. Frequently Asked Questions, GOV’T OF CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/ 
drugs-health-products/medical-use-marijuana/licensed-producers/frequently-asked-questions-medical-use-
marihuana.html (last visited July 2, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
24. Id.  
25. A Framework for the Legalization and Regulation of Cannabis in Canada, supra note 4, at 2.  
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significant changes to the current approach to agricultural regulation.26 Notably, 
the report recommended that: 1) the federal government take the lead on 
regulating agriculture; 2) licensing schemes be adapted to promote a diversity of 
cultivators, including small-scale farmers; and 3) environmental protection be 
promoted through regulations that include licensing and supporting outdoor 
farmers.27 If implemented, the recommendations would represent a markedly 
more diverse and inclusive approach to marijuana agriculture regulation. 
This essay proceeds accordingly. In Part II, a brief history of marijuana 
prohibition, legalization, and regulation in the U.S. and Canada is provided and 
contrasted. Part III paints a picture of marijuana agriculture regulation in the U.S. 
by exploring approaches in three states (California, Colorado, and Washington) 
where regulatory frameworks for cultivation are relatively developed.28 Part IV 
tells the Canadian story (where agricultural production is, for now, scarcely 
permitted), while looking ahead to impending regulations for recreational 
marijuana.29 Part V concludes by drawing out common regulatory successes and 
failures, with an eye toward lessons learned that can inform the future 
development of marijuana agriculture regulations in the United States and 
Canada. 
II. DIVERGENT PATHS TOWARD CRIMINALIZATION AND LEGALIZATION: A BRIEF 
HISTORY OF MARIJUANA IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 
While regulatory approaches to marijuana in the U.S. and Canada are 
nascent, cultivation of marijuana is centuries-old.30 One of humanity’s oldest 
cultivated crops, marijuana can be traced back 12,000 years to hunter-gatherers 
who appreciated its nutritious and psychoactive properties.31 In Neolithic times 
marijuana traveled from its roots in China and Siberia along the Silk Road to the 
Middle East and Europe.32 Once there it flourished in classical Greek, Roman, 
and Arab societies.33 European colonialism cemented marijuana as a global 
 
26. Id. at 4. 
27. Id. at 4.  
28. Infra Part III. 
29. Infra Part IV. 
30. This section draws on previous research addressing marijuana agriculture. See Ryan B. Stoa, Weed 
and Water Law: Regulating Legal Marijuana, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 565 (2016); Ryan B. Stoa, Marijuana 
Agriculture Law: Regulation at the Root of an Industry, 69(2) FLORIDA L. REV. (forthcoming, 2017); and Ryan 
B. Stoa, Marijuana Appellations: The Case for Cannabicultural Designations of Origin, 11(1) HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
31. Barney Warf, High Points: An Historical Geography of Cannabis, 104 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 415, 
419 (2014) (citing ERNEST L. ABEL, MARIHUANA: THE FIRST TWELVE THOUSAND YEARS (Plenum Press 1st ed. 
1980)). 
32. Id. at 419–20.  
33. Id. at 423 (citing JAMES L. BUTRICA, THE MEDICAL USE OF CANNABIS AMONG THE GREEKS AND 
ROMANS (Hawthorn 1st ed. 2006); D.C.A. HILLMAN PH.D., THE CHEMICAL MUSE (Thomas Dunne Books 1st 
ed. 2008); ERNEST L. ABEL, MARIHUANA: THE FIRST TWELVE THOUSAND YEARS (Plenum Press 1st ed. 1980); 
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commodity, spreading its cultivation, trade, and use throughout the Western 
Hemisphere and into what is now the United States and Canada.34 
A. Prohibition and Legalization in the United States 
Marijuana in the United States was for many years overshadowed by the 
other major derivative of its taxonomic species cannabis sativa: hemp.35 While 
marijuana is primarily grown and used for its medicinal or recreational 
psychoactive properties, hemp strains are grown to produce food, textiles, paper, 
and other materials.36 Queen Elizabeth required large landowners throughout the 
British Empire to grow hemp to counter Britain’s reliance on Russian hemp 
imports;37 later the Jamestown colonists would be required to do the same.38 Both 
George Washington and Thomas Jefferson were hemp growers, and the 
Declaration of Independence was written on hemp.39 John Adams was a 
prominent supporter of hemp cultivation, writing frequently about its benefits.40 
“Seems to me if grate Men dont leeve off writing Pollyticks, breaking Heads, 
boxing Ears, ringing Noses and kicking Breeches, we shall by and by want a 
world of Hemp more for our own consumshon,” Adams wrote.41 
Hemp and marijuana would continue to be grown throughout the 19th and 
early 20th centuries.42 Like any other legal agricultural commodity, marijuana 
was subject to variations in state agricultural laws and policies. For example, the 
fact that a water rights dispute before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1852 
involved a contractual obligation to use water solely for certain purposes that 
included a hemp-mill was found unremarkable by the court.43 In 1947, a 
 
FRANZ ROSENTHAL, THE HERB: HASHISH VERSUS MEDIEVAL MUSLIM SOCIETY (Brill Press 1st ed. 1971)). 
34. Id. at 425–26 (citing WILLIAM PARTRIDGE, CANNABIS AND CULTURAL GROUPS IN A COLOMBIAN 
MUNICIPIO (Mouton Publishers 1st ed. 1975); JOHNATHAN GREEN, CANNABIS (Thunder’s Mouth Press 1st ed. 
2002); JAMES H. MILLS, CANNABIS IN COLONIAL INDIA: PRODUCTION, STATE INTERVENTION, AND RESISTANCE 
IN THE LATE NINETEENTH-CENTURY BENGALI LANDSCAPE (Oxford University Press 1st ed. 2005)). 
35. For a review of the taxonomy of marijuana and hemp, see generally Ernest Small & Arthur Cronquist, 
A Practical and Natural Taxonomy for Cannabis, 25 TAXON, no. 4, at  405, 410 (1976); Shannon L. Datwyler 
Ph.D. & George D. Weiblen Ph.D., Genetic Variation in Hemp and Marijuana (Cannabis sativa L.) According 
to Amplified Fragment Length Polymorphisms, 51 J. OF FORENSIC SCI. 371 (2006). 
36. See generally, ROWAN ROBINSON, THE GREAT BOOK OF HEMP: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL, COMMERCIAL, AND MEDICINAL USES OF THE WORLD’S MOST EXTRAORDINARY PLANT 4 
(1st ed. 1996). 
37. Warf, supra note 31, at 426. 
38. MARTIN A. LEE, SMOKE SIGNALS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MARIJUANA – MEDICAL, RECREATIONAL 
AND SCIENTIFIC 16 (1st ed. 2012). 
39. Id. at 16, 18. 
40. Corliss Knapp Engle, John Adams, Farmer and Gardner, 61 ARNOLDIA, no. 4, at 9, 10 (2002). 
41. JOHN ADAMS, III. HUMPHREY PLOUGHJOGGER TO THE BOSTON EVENING-POST (June 20, 1763), 
reprinted in Papers of John Adams, Volume 1, at 7 (MASS. HISTORICAL SOC’Y ed., 2017) 
42. By some accounts, it became the third largest cash crop in the United States by the mid-19th century. 
Lee, supra note 38, at 19. 
43. Washabaugh v. Oyster, 18 Pa. 497, 503 (1852). 
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California tax dispute involved the development of wells for purposes of 
irrigating hemp.44 The court overseeing the dispute thought the plan could “prove 
a profitable industry,” before moving on to the legal matter at issue.45 
But the widespread use of both hemp and marijuana in the United States 
catalyzed opposition to cannabis sativa’s legality from multiple angles. On the 
one hand, marijuana’s early popularity with immigrants and bohemian 
communities produced reactionary prejudices that prompted crude public 
campaigns to criminalize the drug.46 On the other hand, hemp’s industrial 
versatility was a threat to the cotton industry and other producers of textiles.47 
Despite strong support in the medical and pharmaceutical industries, twenty-nine 
states banned cannabis between 1915–1931.48 
The federal government then passed the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, 
creating barriers to marijuana production, sale, and consumption.49 The Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Leary v. United States overturned the Marihuana Tax Act on the 
grounds that compliance would violate a person’s right against self-
incrimination.50 The decision prompted Congress to repeal the Act and replace it 
with the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, which 
categorized marijuana as a Schedule I narcotic with prohibitions on cultivation, 
sale, possession, and use.51 Marijuana has been a black market crop ever since.52 
Because states developed modern regulatory regimes in the latter half of the 
twentieth century,53 after marijuana was criminalized, those regimes have never 
been regulated by the marijuana industry. This is true of many agricultural laws 
and policies as well, which have traditionally been dictated or influenced by 
federal agricultural policy. The pillars of agricultural law and policy set in 
motion in the twentieth century—crop subsidies, government-backed insurance, 
and direct relief payments—are still in place today.54 
 
44. Lerdo Land Co. v. Commissioner, 1947 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 16, *7 (1947). 
45. Id. 
46. Warf, supra note 31, at 429–30. See also REEFER MADNESS (Motion Picture Ventures 1936) 
(depicting the graphic horrors of marijuana use in ways that would appear satirical today). 
47. Warf, supra note 31, at 429. 
48. Walsh, supra note 5, at 19. 
49. Marihuana Tax Act of Aug. 2, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937). 
50. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 13 (1969). 
51. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 
Stat. 1236 (1970); see also Walsh, supra note 5, at 23. 
52. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of  Oct. 27, 1970, supra note 51. 
53. See, e.g., Ryan B. Stoa, Florida Water Management Districts and the Florida Water Resources Act: 
The Challenges of Basin-Level Management, 7 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 74 (2015). 
54. The Agricultural Act of 2014, which establishes agricultural spending for the next ten years, allocates 
$44.4 billion for commodity programs and $90 billion for crop insurance. Disaster relief funds were distributed 
a week after the Act was signed into law, including $100 million for livestock losses in California. Agricultural 
Act of 2014, H.R. 2642, 113th Cong. (2014); Brad Plumer, The $956 Billion Farm Bill, In One Graph, WASH. 
POST. (Jan. 28, 2014), http://goo.gl/gQOvl8 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Press 
Release, USDA: Obama Administration Announces Additional Assistance to Californians Impacted by Drought 
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Needless to say, the marijuana industry was not swept up in these initiatives. 
For the most part, marijuana cultivation in the United States for much of the 
twentieth century was conducted by small-scale farmers acting in violation of 
state and federal agricultural laws and policies.55 Despite prohibition and a lack 
of government support, however, marijuana farmers have done quite well for 
themselves in the United States. A 2006 pro-marijuana study, focused on 
valuation, pegged the total value of domestic marijuana production at $35.8 
billion, based on an estimate of over 56 million plants grown annually.56 If 
accurate, the figures would make marijuana the largest cash crop in the United 
States, and a top five cash crop in thirty-nine states.57 Today there are 
approximately 50,000 marijuana farms in the state of California alone.58 There 
are as many marijuana farms in Humboldt County, California, as there are 
wineries statewide.59 
The ineffectiveness of prohibition, combined with a public that is 
increasingly receptive to marijuana use, has led to a rapid shift in marijuana 
policy on the state level. Legalization is largely taking place through voter 
demands and ballot initiatives. California, perhaps not surprisingly, became the 
first state to legalize medical marijuana use when voters passed Proposition 215, 
the Compassionate Use Act of 1996.60 Colorado and Washington became the first 
states to legalize recreational marijuana use in 2012, when voters passed 
Amendment 64: The Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol Act, and Washington 
Initiative 502, respectively.61 Following the 2016 election, and at the time of 
writing, medical marijuana use was legal in twenty-eight states, while eight states 
(plus the District of Columbia) had legalized recreational marijuana.62 Only five 
states have maintained a strict prohibition policy on marijuana that does not 
allow for decriminalization or medical use of any kind.63 While the federal 
 
(Feb. 14, 2014), available at  http://goo.gl/EdwPRg (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
55. See Alissa Walker, How Growing More Weed Can Help California Fix Its Water Problems, 
GIZMODO (Oct. 12, 2015), http://goo.gl/ZEwFpT (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(noting the estimated 50,000 pot farms in California alone). 
56. Jon Gettman Ph.D., Marijuana Production in the United States, THE BULL. OF CANNABIS REFORM, 
Dec. 2006, at 1, 13. Those estimates have been questioned, with production valuations closer to $3–5 billion. 
See CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION, WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 41 (1st ed. 2012). See 
also, Michael Montgomery, Marijuana Not Top U.S. Cash Crop: Book, CA. WATCH, NBC BAY AREA NEWS, 
http://goo.gl/InOpuu (last visited July 22, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); and 
PATRICK REA ET AL., THE STATE OF LEGAL MARIJUANA MARKETS (3rd ed. 2014).  
57. Gettman, supra note 56, at 13. 
58. Walker, supra note 55. 
59. Id. 
60. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY. CODE § 11362.5 (Westlaw 2017); Cohen, supra note 9. 
61. Colo. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 (2012) (Colorado constitutional amendment 64); Wash. Initiative 
Measure No. 502 (2012); Szalavitz, supra note 10. 
62. 29 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, supra note 11; Marijuana Overview, supra note 11. 
63. By “strict prohibition policy,” I mean states that have passed neither decriminalization laws nor allow 
for non-psychoactive marijuana consumption for medical purposes. These states are Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, and 
South Dakota. Marijuana Overview, supra note 11; State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 12.  
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marijuana prohibition continues to suppress development of the marijuana 
industry, it is clear that state efforts to legalize marijuana will continue, creating 
demand for appropriate regulatory frameworks. 
B. Prohibition and Legalization in Canada 
Canada was similarly swept up in the anti-marijuana fervor of the early 
twentieth-century. As with the United States, prohibition of marijuana was partly 
motivated by race relations and fears that drug users would corrupt and violate 
innocent women and children.64 Unlike the U.S., however, Canadian prohibition 
efforts were driven by the apparent connection between psychoactive drugs and 
Chinese-Canadian culture.65 Prior to 1908, Canadians were free to purchase 
commercially available drugs such as opium and cocaine.66 But the rancor 
between white and Chinese Canadians prompted a backlash against these and 
other drugs, and legislation quickly followed suit between 1908–1920.67 This 
wave of drug criminalization culminated in the 1923 Act to Prohibit the Improper 
Use of Opium and Other Drugs, which listed marijuana as a prohibited 
substance.68 
Canadian marijuana cultivation, use, and prosecution remained relatively 
dormant until the 1960s, when both consumption and prosecutions increased 
exponentially.69 The Narcotic Control Act of 1961 was an attempt to crack down, 
increasing penalties and enabling prosecutions.70 According to some, marijuana 
users became the primary target of law enforcement during the 1960s.71 Unlike in 
 
64. CATHERINE CARSTAIRS, ‘HOP HEADS’ AND ‘HYPES’: DRUG USE, REGULATION AND RESISTANCE IN 
CANADA, 1920-1961, at  32–33 (2000). 
65. Id. at 15. 
66. Id. at 6.  
67. These include the 1908 Opium Act, , the Opium and Drug Act of 1911, and the Opium and Narcotic 
Drug Act of 1920. Guy Ati Dion, The Structure of Drug Prohibition in International Law and in Canadian 
Law, Senate of Canada, Appendix 2 (Aug. 1999), https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/371/ille/ 
presentation/dion-e.htm (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
68. See also Daniel Schwartz, Marijuana Was Criminalized In 1923, But Why?, CBCNEWS: HEALTH 
(May 3, 2014), https://goo.gl/7QKPdt (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); and Deborah 
Yedlin, To Some, It’s the Infamous Five, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Oct. 19, 2004), https://goo.gl/iLZDwu (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review); but see Yolande House, “THE GRANDMOTHER OF MARIJUANA 
PROHIBITION” THE MYTH OF EMILY MURPHY AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN CANADA (2003), 
https://goo.gl/gYWYdn (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
69. In 1962 there were a reported 20 cannabis-related prosecutions. In 1972 there were 12,000. Leah 
Spicer, Historical and Cultural Uses of Cannabis and the Canadian “Marijuana Clash”, Senate of Canada pt. 
II.B (Apr. 12, 2002), https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/371/ille/library/spicer-e.htm (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
70. Health Protection Branch, Dep’t of Nat’l Health and Welfare, Cannabis Control Policy: A Discussion 
Paper (Jan. 1979), available at http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/library/studies/ccp/ccp_46.htm (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
71. Benedict Fischer, Sharan Kuganesan & Robin Room, Medical Marijuana Programs: Implications for 
Cannabis Control Policy—Observations from Canada, 26 INT’L J. OF DRUG POL’Y 15-16 (2015).  
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the U.S., however, the controversial nature of marijuana prohibition, and its 
impact on convicted users, prompted a federal inquiry into marijuana policy 
reform.72 The Le Dain Commission Report of 1972 called for a federal repeal of 
the marijuana prohibition on personal cultivation and use.73 While not adopted by 
subsequent governments, the report prompted calls for decriminalization and 
legalization on a national level, and set the stage for judicial intervention.74 
Terrance Parker suffered from epilepsy and frequent seizures.75 He attempted 
to control the seizures through surgery and conventional medications, but found 
that only marijuana was an effective treatment.76 Not having a legal source of 
marijuana, Parker grew it himself, and was subsequently charged with violating 
federal marijuana prohibition laws.77 His appeal reached the Court of Appeal for 
Ontario, whose remarkable decision in Regina v. Parker, 49 O.R. (3d) 481 
[2000], deemed the federal prohibition of marijuana unconstitutional on the 
grounds that prohibiting medical use in cases where it is necessary represents a 
deprivation of liberty, security, and fundamental justice.78 The Court 
characterized Canada’s experience with marijuana regulation as “an 
embarrassing history based upon misinformation and racism.”79 The prohibition 
on marijuana possession was invalidated, with a delay of the invalidity of one 
year provided so as to allow Parliament to craft appropriate regulatory 
legislation.80 
Accordingly, the Medical Marihuana Access Regulations (MMAR) were 
passed in 2001.81 Under the MMAR, medical marijuana could be provided if 
prospective patients’ conditions were on the federal list of severe or chronic 
illnesses.82 With a prescription, a patient could obtain marijuana directly from the 
government, or cultivate marijuana at home.83 The system was problematic, 
however. Few patients qualified for prescriptions, and the supply of marijuana 
was inconsistent.84 Many continued to obtain marijuana outside of the federal 
program.85 
 
72. Le Dain Report on Drugs Divides Cabinet, CBC, http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/ledain-report-on-
drugs-divides-cabinet (last visited July 22, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
73. Gerald Le Dain, Heinz Lehmann & J. Peter Stein, The Report of the Canadian Government 
Commission of Inquiry into the Non-Medical Use of Drugs – 1972, SCHAFFER LIBRARY OF DRUG POL’Y (1972), 
https://goo.gl/CaZzqk (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
74. Le Dain Report on Drugs Divides Cabinet, supra note 72. 
75. Parker, supra note 14, at ¶ 3. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at ¶ 10.  
79. Id. at ¶ 126. 
80. Id. at ¶ 21. 
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In Regina v. J.P., 64 O.R. (3d) 757 (2003), the Court of Appeal for Ontario 
found the MMAR insufficient to overcome the deprivations of liberty, security, 
and fundamental justice created by preventing patients from accessing medical 
marijuana.86 Subsequent decisions reinforced this point,87 including a 2008 
decision invalidating the MMAR’s provisions severely restricting the supply of 
marijuana.88 The opinion noted that while the government may have an interest in 
regulating the size and number of cultivators, its regulations cannot be so 
restrictive so as to preclude access to medical patients.89 
Reform of the MMAR came in 2014 with passage of the Marihuana for 
Medical Purposes Regulations (MMPR).90 The MMPR broadens the pool of 
potential medical users by authorizing licensed physicians to prescribe marijuana 
for conditions they deem appropriate, doing away with the MMAR’s limited list 
of conditions.91 In addition, the MMPR withdrew the government as a marijuana 
supplier, and instead tasks Health Canada with licensing and regulating 
cultivators.92 Despite these changes, the supply of marijuana remains limited, 
partly due to the low number of licensed cultivators.93 
While Canada’s experience with federal medical marijuana legalization and 
regulation is mixed, the new Labour Party-controlled government (brought to 
power in 2015), is moving forward with promises to legalize and regulate 
marijuana for recreational use.94 The Task Force on Cannabis Legalization and 
Regulation’s 2016 report calls for an overhaul of the current regulatory 
framework for medical marijuana, opening the doors to small-scale farmers, 
promoting environmentally sound growing practices (such as outdoor farming), 
and envisioning a parallel market for hemp production.95 It remains to be seen if 
full-blown legalization for recreational use will be implemented, but considering 
its importance in the Labour Party’s campaign platform, legislation in the coming 
months appears likely. 
  
 
86. Regina v. J.P. (2003), 64 O.R. 3d 757, ¶ 17 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
87. See Regina v. Long (2007), 88 O.R. 3d 146, ¶ 4 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
88. Sfetkopoulos v. Canada (2008), FC 33, 399–400 (Can. Ont. Fed. Ct.). 
89. “[I]t may well be that there could be justification for limiting the size of operations of designated 
producers, to facilitate supervision and inspection for quality and security. But any new regulations to this end will 
have to be justified as having a demonstrable purpose rationally related to legitimate state interests. No such 
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90. Canada Medical Marijuana (MMPR) Guide: 25 Questions & Answers, Leaf Science (Apr. 1, 2014), 
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93. Authorized Licensed Producers of Cannabis for Medical Purposes, supra note 20; Application 
Process: Becoming a Licensed Producer of Cannabis for Medical Purposes, supra note 21.  
94. A Framework for the Legalization and Regulation of Cannabis in Canada, supra note 4, at 2. 
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III. SUBNATIONAL APPROACHES TO MARIJUANA AGRICULTURE REGULATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
Because the U.S. federal government has not pursued a national approach to 
marijuana legalization and regulation, the U.S. experience is limited to those of 
the individual states. However, because many states have recently passed 
legislation and are actively addressing marijuana agriculture more or less 
independently of one another, there are a diversity of regulatory approaches to 
compare. This section will profile three states in particular: California, which 
legalized medical marijuana use in 1996 and recreational use twenty years later 
in 2016;96 Colorado, which legalized medical use in 2000 and recreational use in 
2012;97 and Washington, which legalized medical use in 1998 and recreational 
use in 2012.98 These states were selected because they have a relatively 
meaningful history of marijuana regulation, they have significant numbers of 
marijuana farmers, and they have taken different approaches to the regulation of 
marijuana agriculture. 
Despite their differing regulatory frameworks, all three states share a 
common feature: involvement of local governments in the regulation of 
marijuana agriculture. The cause is likely multi-faceted. States may want to 
foster a multitude of regulatory approaches in order to experiment with and 
identify those rules and regulations that might work best on the state level. In 
addition, since legalization has thus far taken place primarily by ballot initiative, 
legislatures may be politically hesitant to embrace the marijuana industry, and 
providing a strong role for local governments may be an effective means of 
reducing political conflicts. 
In any case, local governments are likely to use their power to make 
ordinances as the primary legal mechanism to regulate marijuana agriculture. 
Ordinances have the force of law, and can be created to regulate a variety of local 
issues, such as public health and safety, land use, and use of public spaces. 
Counties or municipalities are granted the power to enact ordinances from state 
constitutions or state statutes. California regulations, for example, authorize local 
governments to enact local laws in accordance with the state statute.99 Colorado 
grants extensive powers to city and county governments, allowing them to 
increase taxes or prohibit marijuana cultivation altogether.100 Washington did not 
initially grant cities and counties the power to enact marijuana regulations, but 
 
96. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE  § 11362.1 (West 2016); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE  § 11362.1 
(West 2016). 
97. Colo. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14; Colo. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 (2012) (constitutional amendment 64). 
98. Wash. Initiative 692 (1998); Wash. Initiative 502 (2012). 
99. LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL’S DIGEST OF AB 266, (Oct. 9, 2015). “(a) Pursuant to Section 7 of Article XI 
of the California Constitution, . . . a . . . county may adopt ordinances that establish additional standards, 
requirements, and regulations for local licenses and permits for commercial cannabis activity.” Id.  
100. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16, subd. 5(e), 5(f).  
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many municipalities took it upon themselves to enact their own regulations 
anyway, a practice that was subsequently upheld in Green Collar LLC v. Pierce 
County.101 The participation of local governments in the regulation of marijuana 
agriculture is likely to continue as states delicately move forward with 
legalization. 
A note on a fourth approach being used by a number of states with nascent 
marijuana regulation frameworks is worth mentioning briefly. While California, 
Colorado, and Washington are developing laws to allow for a broad farming 
community, states like Florida,102 New York,103 and Ohio104 would limit 
cultivation licenses to less than a dozen. This type of approach allows the state to 
carefully select responsible cultivators, makes it easy to monitor cultivation, and 
buys time before presumably shifting to a more expansive model. With so few 
cultivators, states can lavish regulatory attention on the licensees to ensure 
compliance, or craft site-specific rules depending on the needs and cultivation 
infrastructure of the operation.105 And in a sense the system is predictable by 
making it clear that only a select number of businesses may cultivate marijuana. 
There are two major drawbacks to this model. Although limiting cultivation 
licenses might promote sustainability and reduce the regulatory burden, it is hard 
to find equity or public support when the state permits only a small handful of 
cultivators to participate in the market. Ohio’s 2015 constitutional amendment 
initiative to legalize marijuana included a list of landowners who would have had 
exclusive rights to cultivate marijuana in the state.106 The attempt to control the 
market prompted some legislators to introduce a constitutional amendment of 
their own that would prohibit the state’s constitution from being used to create 
economic monopolies.107 Voters rejected the legalization monopoly initiative 
 
101. Green Collar LLC v. Pierce County, No. 14-2-11323-0 WL 8187081 (Wash. 2014); see also Att’y 
Gen. Bob Ferguson, Whether Statewide Initiative Establishing System for Licensing Marijuana Producers, 
Processors, and Retailers Preempts Local Ordinances, AGO 2014 No. 2 (2014). 
102. S.B. 1030, 2014 Leg., 2014–2016 Sess. (Fla. 2014). 
103. A.B. A06357, 2013 Leg., 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013); see also Catherine Rafter, New York 
State Just Granted Five Medical Marijuana Licenses, OBSERVER NEWS (July 31, 2015), http://goo.gl/JqBdtG 
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104. Programs: Cultivation, OHIO MED. MARIJUANA CONTROL PROGRAM, http://www.medical 
marijuana.ohio.gov/cultivation (last visited July 15, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
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105. In principle states can tailor any number of water or agricultural permits, but there is a limit to how 
extensive the specifications can be when administering large volumes of permit applications. See Gary D. 
Lynne, J. S. Shonkwiler & Michael E. Wilson, Water Permitting Behavior Under the 1972 Florida Water 
Resources Act, 67 LAND ECON. 340, 348 (1991).  
106. The amendment’s text includes the tax parcel numbers of the properties in question: “Subject to the 
exceptions set forth herein, there shall be only ten MGCE facilities, which shall operate on the following real 
properties: (1) Being an approximate 40.44 acre area in Butler County, Ohio, identified by the Butler County 
Auditor, as of February 2, 2015, as tax parcel numbers Q6542084000008 and Q6542084000041[. . .].” OHIO 
CONST. ART. XV, § 12 (proposed amendment to add section 12). 
107. H.R.J. Res. 4, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015).  
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(which lacked support from some pro-legalization groups) while approving the 
anti-monopoly amendment.108 
Even if the state transitions to a more permissive model eventually, the 
previously licensed cultivators will have a government-given leg-up on the 
competition. And while the state may have developed the capacity to create site-
specific regulations under the restrictive model, those capacities would be less 
relevant when cultivation proliferates and a more comprehensive regulatory 
approach is needed. 
More importantly perhaps, severe limitations on cultivation licenses ignore 
the existence and persistence of black market cultivators. If marijuana cultivation 
were not occurring to begin with, or were unlikely to take root, a limited 
licensing approach might be sensible. But marijuana is widely available in part 
because domestic cultivation is increasing across the United States, particularly 
on private lands.109 With legalization efforts gaining momentum and spreading 
knowledge on cultivation methods, it seems unlikely that marijuana cultivation 
will remain dormant for long. Considering the size and growth of the marijuana 
industry, eradication of unlicensed marijuana cultivators is unlikely.110 Limiting 
cultivation to a small handful of businesses offers transitional benefits, but is 
unlikely to be a sound long-term solution. 
A. California 
California represents the United States’ largest marijuana agriculture region 
by a significant margin. California’s 50,000 marijuana farms account for 60% of 
all marijuana grown in the United States.111 According to one study, 80% of 
marijuana consumed in the U.S. in 2012 was grown in California.112 However, it 
would be misleading to suggest that this growth has been a deliberate result of 
state agricultural policies. While recent reforms are progressively addressing 
marijuana agriculture issues in an attempt to make the industry strong and safe, 
for many years the legalization process was lacking in meaningful regulations. 
In 1996, California voters passed Proposition 215, the Compassionate Use 
Act (CUA).113 With the CUA California became the first state to legalize the 
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medicinal use of marijuana, exempting patients and prescribing physicians from 
criminal prosecution.114 The text of the act was short, and did not address how the 
state or local governments were intended to regulate the marijuana industry. It 
did not, for example, assign regulatory authority to an administrative agency, 
articulate limits on possession or cultivation, or propose a broad regulatory 
framework from which the state or local governments could operate. 
In the wake of the CUA, a legal medical marijuana industry was created in 
California, and the industry experienced tremendous growth, notwithstanding the 
absence of any meaningful state regulations. But the CUA’s omissions prompted 
the state legislature to enact the Medical Marijuana Program Act (MMPA) in 
2003, which, among other measures, restricted the number of plants medical 
marijuana patients or designated caregivers could cultivate,115 and assigned 
further regulatory authority to the Attorney General.116 Even these limits, 
however, became legally ambiguous guidelines after the California Supreme 
Court ruled that the rights established by constitutional amendment Proposition 
215 could not be limited by legislative act.117 The upshot of these early 
experiments with marijuana legalization is that California’s burgeoning 
marijuana industry has been more or less unregulated for twenty years. 
Many farmers would welcome the security of being in compliance with state 
and local laws, while being distinguished from cartel operations or destructive 
“trespass grows” on public lands. As it stands, farms on private property remain 
vulnerable to police raids and asset forfeiture laws,118 and are unable to take 
advantage of typical agricultural government services, such as crop insurance 
programs or pesticide-free certifications. 
Fortunately, change is on the horizon in California. In January 2016, the 
Medical Marijuana Regulation and Safety Act (MMRSA) came into effect, with 
ambitious proposals to create comprehensive regulations for marijuana 
agriculture.119 The MMRSA assigns authority for various regulatory 
responsibilities to a variety of state agencies, including the Department of Food 
and Agriculture, Department of Fish and Wildlife, Department of Public Health, 
and the State Water Resources Control Board.120 Said the author of the bill, 
“cultivators are going to have to comply with the same kinds of regulations that 
typical farmers do. . .it’s going to be treated like an agriculture product.”121 Many 
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considered the MMRSA to be a critical precursor to recreational marijuana use 
regulations that would be necessary should recreational use be legalized. That 
concern proved prescient. 
In November 2016, California voters passed Proposition 64, the Adult Use of 
Marijuana Act (AUMA).122 AUMA legalized marijuana for recreational use, and 
largely mirrored the MMRSA by delegating specific responsibilities to a broad 
array of state agencies. AUMA’s cultivation regulations are also similar to the 
MMRSA’s, requiring farmers to comply with environmental laws, pesticide 
restrictions, and licensing requirements. At the same time, AUMA calls for the 
state to create an organic certification program, plant labeling and tracking, and 
potentially designations of origin. 
AUMA departs from the MMRSA in one important respect, however. While 
the MMRSA limited the total canopy size of indoor farms to half an acre, and 
outdoor farms to one acre, AUMA’s drafters included a provision that would 
allow the state to issue Type 5 licenses. No canopy size limits are imposed on 
Type 5 licenses, paving the way for large-scale, industrial production of 
marijuana.123 Large-scale cultivation may flood the market with cheap marijuana, 
but at the cost of quality control and the livelihoods of the state’s many artisanal 
small-scale farmers. Type 5 licenses cannot be issued before 2023, so the state 
will have time to consider the issue. However, a battle between small-scale 
farmers and agricultural conglomerates seeking to take over the industry may 
loom large on these discussions. 
B. Colorado 
Colorado legalized recreational marijuana in 2012 by passing Amendment 
64: The Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol Act.124 The alcohol analogy was a 
clever political tactic by legalization proponents, as it situates marijuana into the 
same seemingly benign category. However, the analogy may suggest a regulatory 
blind-spot. Unlike California, which has been recently proactive in 
acknowledging and regulating the agricultural side of the marijuana industry, 
Colorado has employed a more piece-meal approach to agricultural regulation. 
In order to thoughtfully develop legislation for a legal marijuana market in 
Colorado, a task force was established to investigate legal and regulatory issues 
and propose legislative and executive actions. The task force appropriately 
identified some agricultural issues,125 such as the need to regulate pesticides and 
waste products, tax cultivators, and establish cultivation limits,126 but broader 
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issues central to agricultural development (such as water use or permitted 
cultivation practices) were not addressed.127 
Colorado has since struggled to develop a regulatory framework that 
efficiently assigns responsibilities among agencies. The state’s experience with 
marijuana agriculture demonstrates the difficulty of regulating the industry’s 
many facets. Colorado’s Marijuana Enforcement Division, for example, is 
defined by its regulatory identification with marijuana, but not agriculture.128 The 
state’s Department of Agriculture, conversely, is equipped to regulate traditional 
crops but has received little guidance on how to address marijuana cultivation.129 
When the Department reached out to the federal Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) for guidance on which general crop group (e.g., herbs, spices, 
vegetables) marijuana fits into for purposes of pesticide regulation, the EPA 
could only state that marijuana fits into none of these groups.130 Colorado’s 
Marijuana Enforcement Division and Department of Agriculture are both state-
level agencies that do not have sufficient interdisciplinary expertise at present. 
The challenge can be more pronounced at local levels where it can be difficult to 
establish regulatory capacity on one dimension, much less two. 
Ultimately, Colorado’s early experience with marijuana agriculture 
regulation is notable for the state’s adoption of a vertical integration model. In 
other words, marijuana farmers were required to sell what they grew, and 
dispensaries were required to grow what they sold. For regulators, the advantage 
of vertical integration is that it reduces the number of marijuana businesses in 
operation, and makes it easier to track the supply chain from seed to sale. There 
are advantages for marijuana businesses as well—vertical integration increases 
profit margins by reducing the number of profit-seeking firms in the supply 
chain, while allowing for more control over inventory. Vertically-integrated 
businesses may also cut down on redundant business expenses. The vertical 
integration model is mandatory in Massachusetts, Maine, New Jersey, New 
Hampshire, and New Mexico.131 
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On the other hand, the Colorado experience demonstrates that mandatory 
vertical integration has its drawbacks. It is significantly more expensive to 
finance a business that incorporates the cultivation, post-production, and retail 
sale of marijuana. By some estimates, it can be three to ten times more expensive 
to establish a vertically-integrated marijuana business than a retail dispensary.132 
More expertise is required to handle a diversity of marijuana business activities. 
And by wedding each stage of the supply chain together, risk is increased: failure 
in any one aspect of the business is likely to affect the other aspects as well. In 
general, it is unusual to require vertical integration, and the marijuana industry is 
one of the only sectors in which this occurs.133 
In the early years of Colorado’s medical marijuana market, when vertical 
integration was required, the regulatory requirements were so onerous that over a 
third of operators went out of business.134 Other states, recognizing the costs and 
benefits, have opted to allow, but not require, vertical integration. Nevada has 
adopted this approach,135 while Colorado eventually abandoned its initial vertical 
integration requirement.136 Considering the nascent state of the marijuana 
industry, it may be useful to allow a diversity of approaches in order to collect 
evidence on how the industry might grow and stabilize in the future. The same 
can be said about regulating the industry as well, however: there is value in 
letting states experiment with a diversity of regulatory approaches. 
Vertical integration is likely to have particular implications on the 
agricultural component of the marijuana industry. Where it is required, it will 
make cultivation one component of a broader marijuana business, while reducing 
the likelihood that marijuana can become one of several crops grown on a single 
farm. More and more farmers growing traditional crops are considering 
incorporating marijuana into their crop portfolio,137 but in states where vertical 
integration is mandatory it seems unlikely that these farmers will want to devote 
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their resources to post-production and retail in order to do so. The effect is that 
the marijuana industry remains introverted, minimally engaged with the broader 
agricultural community. On the other hand, the supply of marijuana is 
presumably less likely to fluctuate wildly relative to demand if farmers are 
required to sell what they grow. By tying cultivation and retail together, both 
activities may be more responsive to each other. 
Nonetheless, there are promising benefits and concerning costs to vertical 
integration. Colorado eventually moved away from a vertical integration model, 
and now permits farmers to stick to what they know best: farming. But the state’s 
regulatory framework for the marijuana industry lacks a proactive focus on the 
agricultural component of the marijuana industry, an oversight with 
environmental implications. Because Colorado’s marijuana regulations promote 
indoor cultivation, the environmental impact of the marijuana industry has been 
significant. Indoor marijuana farms comprise over half of new demand for 
power.138 Power providers and state regulators are scrambling to adjust to rapid 
changes in the energy sector caused by growth in marijuana agriculture.139 
Nonetheless, Colorado should be lauded for continuing to study, tinker, and 
reform the state’s regulatory frameworks for the marijuana industry. The 
experience is new for the state’s policymakers and regulators, and a blueprint on 
how to regulate the industry does not yet exist. While vertical integration was 
problematic, and the environmental impacts of indoor agriculture persist, 
Colorado appears well poised to refine its regulation of marijuana agriculture to 
adapt to new realities. 
C. Washington 
When Washington voters passed Initiative 502 in 2012, legalizing the 
recreational use of marijuana, they authorized the state to concentrate regulatory 
authority over the industry into one primary agency, the Washington State Liquor 
Control Board.140 Thus, while California represents the agency authority 
fragmentation approach, Washington represents the agency authority 
consolidation approach. The Washington State Liquor Control Board has been 
designated with primary authority to develop rules and regulations for marijuana, 
including aspects of marijuana agriculture, pursuant to legislation authorizing the 
“state liquor control board to regulate” marijuana.141 
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One of the benefits of centralized marijuana regulation is that it may provide 
clarity. The administrative agency assigned to (or created for the purposes of) 
marijuana regulation is aware of its broad mandate, other agencies are not 
confused by their rights and duties, and the private sector and other stakeholders 
can direct their attention to a single agency instead of navigating a complex web 
of agencies and rules.142 A second benefit is that states can more clearly invest 
human and financial resources in a single agency, whereas distributing those 
resources across a network of agencies requires a more nuanced understanding of 
existing agency capacities and needs, and investments can more easily become 
politically influenced.143 Third, because marijuana implicates a diversity of 
processes, including the regulation of cultivation, processing, distribution, retail 
sale, and consumption, as well as the agricultural, economic, and public health 
components of the marijuana industry, a single agency with authority over the 
industry as a whole is well-suited to coordinate regulatory activities and create a 
coherent legal framework as a whole. 
Unfortunately, regulating marijuana agriculture has not been as neat as 
Washington may have initially expected. Inevitably, perhaps, the expertise and 
traditional functions of other agencies have created exceptions to the centralized 
agency paradigm. Washington’s Department of Agriculture, for example, has 
taken an increased role in marijuana cultivation, establishing rules for pesticide 
and fertilizer use, agricultural worker safety, and waste disposal.144 The 
Washington Department of Ecology has also suggested that marijuana farmers 
will be subject to the usual environmental regulations the department oversees.145 
While these developments may positively take advantage of each agency’s 
expertise, the state would benefit from a regulatory framework that more clearly 
authorizes agencies with secondary responsibilities to engage in their areas of 
expertise. 
Aside from this horizontal approach to regulation, Washington’s vertical 
approach to regulation of the marijuana industry is similar to the regulatory 
organization of the alcohol industry. Cultivators cannot hold dispensary licenses, 
while dispensaries cannot hold cultivation licenses. Vertical integration, in other 
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words, is prohibited.146 The model is similar to regulation of the alcohol industry, 
where there is a mandatory delineation between producers, distributors, and 
retailers.147 The idea is that by breaking up supply chain integration, businesses 
have less incentive to promote alcohol or drug abuse, and each group can focus 
on providing goods and services in their area of specialization. The model has 
had limited success in the alcohol industry, where distributors have become 
powerful middlemen and may be dampening the potential for innovation. 
However, it does not yet appear that interest groups in the marijuana industry 
have obtained and exerted undue power over Washington regulators, providing 
hope that the state’s regulatory model will be sustainable in the long-term. 
IV. A NATIONAL APPROACH TO MARIJUANA AGRICULTURE REGULATION IN 
CANADA 
In contrast to the United States’ state-led legalization and regulation efforts, 
Canada’s regulatory regime lies primarily on the national level. As required by 
judicial decisions in Regina v. Parker, Regina v. J.P., and Sfetkopoulos v. 
Canada, among others, the Canadian government implemented a framework for 
regulating the marijuana industry. With regard to Canada’s approach to 
marijuana agriculture, the Marihuana for Medical Purposes Regulations (MMPR) 
reformed the Medical Marihuana Access Regulations (MMAR) in several 
important respects. 
A. Cultivation Requirements of the Medical Marihuana Access Regulations 
The MMAR, established in 2001, was a very limited medical marijuana 
scheme. Because the enumerated medical conditions that would qualify for 
marijuana treatment were so few (and relatively rare), Health Canada (tasked 
with administering the program) was not overly concerned about developing a 
robust supply chain. Approved medical marijuana patients could obtain 
marijuana from three sources: they could grow it themselves, a “designated 
supplier” could grow it on their behalf, or it could be purchased directly from 
Health Canada. This cultivation framework was problematic in several ways. 
First, the MMAR’s limits on home cultivation were excessively complex, using 
formulas instead of straightforward plant and storage quantity limits.148 In 
addition to the confusing cultivation regulations, the application processes for 
both patients and designated suppliers were cumbersome, especially when 
compared to the relative ease many users experienced when purchasing 
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marijuana on the illicit market.149 When the market developed a work-around in 
the form of “compassion clubs” designed to collectively organize, grow, and 
supply marijuana on behalf of medical marijuana patients, the government 
cracked down and interpreted compassion clubs as a violation of the MMAR.150 
Marijuana supplied directly by Health Canada was equally problematic. In 
order to meet its statutory obligation to provide access to marijuana to medical 
patients, Health Canada awarded a $5.7 million contract to a single company—
Prairie Plant Systems (PPS)—tasked with cultivating marijuana on the 
government’s behalf.151 The results were underwhelming. PPS first proposed to 
base its farming operations at the bottom of a former zinc and copper mine in 
Manitoba, where tests had found elevated levels of heavy metal contamination in 
air, water, and soil samples.152 The quality of the marijuana grown by PPS was 
suspect as well.153 Although Health Canada claimed a THC content level of 10%, 
tests revealed THC levels were consistently lower, and some biological tests 
found mold and other biological impurities in the marijuana.154 There was little 
evidence that Health Canada was testing the marijuana before delivering it to 
patients, despite charging a significant retail mark-up. And to make matters 
worse for patients, they were given no choice with respect to the marijuana’s 
psychoactive characteristics or potency, strain, or cultivation method (e.g., 
organic). 
The results of the MMAR’s cultivation regulations were predictable. Of the 
few patients who were approved for medical marijuana use, very few of them 
obtained their marijuana from the government.155 Most—over 80%—chose to 
grow their own supply.156 Patients who purchased Health Canada’s marijuana 
rated the quality of the marijuana received in very low terms, and many 
attempted to return the product for a refund.157 From a broader perspective, it is 
clear that most Canadian marijuana users continued to obtain marijuana from the 
black market, despite the existence of the MMAR. 
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B. Cultivation Requirements of the Marihuana for Medical Purposes 
Regulations 
These concerns led to an overhaul of marijuana regulations, culminating in 
the Marihuana for Medical Purposes Regulations (MMPR). The MMPR altered 
the regulatory landscape in several very significant ways. First, the MMPR 
abolished the MMAR’s enumerated list of medical conditions that qualify a 
patient for medical marijuana use. Instead, the MMPR places the burden of 
diagnosis and treatment on medical professionals, a gate-keeping responsibility 
the medical community did not necessarily appreciate.158 
Nonetheless, the relinquishment of the patient licensing process was 
accompanied by a renewed focus on cultivation regulations. This shift was 
accomplished in three steps. First, the MMPR eliminated the MMAR’s personal 
cultivation or designated supplier provisions.159 While some MMAR-sanctioned 
patients with home grows were grandfathered in, the MMPR’s many new 
patients were no longer able to grow their own supply.160 Second, the government 
eliminated its role as a marijuana supplier.161 Criticisms of Health Canada and 
PPS—and the quality, price, and availability of their marijuana—were fierce, and 
it appears the government recognized that it had little to gain by involving itself 
as a market participant of sorts. 
The chain of supply, therefore, was created in a third and final step. The 
MMPR adopted a new regulatory approach in which the government would act in 
a licensing and monitoring capacity over approved cultivators.162 In this way, 
Health Canada maintains a strong regulatory presence over marijuana agriculture, 
without involving itself directly in agricultural activities. Unfortunately, the 
agency’s complex bureaucratic requirements appear to be stifling cultivators 
from participating in the market. To date, Health Canada has only issued thirty-
seven cultivation licenses nation-wide,163 despite receiving 1,561 applications.164 
Eleven Canadian provinces have two cultivators or less.165 Ontario, by contrast, 
contains twenty-four of the thirty-seven licensed cultivators.166 This distribution 
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is hardly equitable from a geographic perspective, nor is it likely to be supplying 
the demand for marijuana amongst the Canadian public. 
The MMPR did make some positive changes to the previous regulatory 
framework. Health Canada does limit the strains sold by licensed cultivators, 
allowing for a more diverse product base for medical patients. In addition, the 
government is no longer a middleman marking up prices; cultivators are free to 
set their own prices as the market dictates. In other respects, however, the MMPR 
is overly restrictive. By prohibiting outdoor agriculture, cultivators are forced to 
artificially reproduce the light, soil, and water conditions found on outdoor farms. 
In addition, the MMPR only permits the cultivation and sale of dried marijuana. 
Derivative products often popular with medical users—such as resins, oils, and 
edibles—remain prohibited.167 
C. Looking Forward to Legalization Legislation and Agricultural Regulations 
The Labour Party-led federal government has promised to legalize and 
regulate recreational marijuana use. Not surprisingly, it may take some time to 
develop and implement this legislation, and it remains to be seen how the 
government will address marijuana agriculture. Still, early signs are encouraging. 
In August of 2016, the government adopted the Access to Cannabis for Medical 
Purposes Regulations (ACMPR).168 While the ACMPR preserves the MMPR in 
many ways, it makes a simple but significant change by allowing medical 
marijuana patients to cultivate their own marijuana plants for personal 
consumption, or allow a designated supplier to do so on their behalf.169 In this 
sense, the ACMPR incorporates the MMAR’s personal cultivation allowances 
into the MMPR. While not an overhaul of the cultivation regulations in the 
MMPR, this tweak should improve access to marijuana while the country waits 
for legalization legislation to change the landscape. 
If the Task Force on Cannabis Legalization and Regulation’s report is any 
indication, the landscape change will be dramatic. The report calls for new 
cultivation regulations that reform the existing framework in at least two major 
ways: 1) licensing schemes should be adapted and made more flexible and 
permissive in order to promote a diversity of cultivators, including small-scale 
farmers; and 2) environmental protection and sustainability should be promoted 
through regulations that include licensing and supporting outdoor farmers.170 
According to the Task Force, the first goal might be achieved by maintaining 
production controls, at least in the early stages of legalization.171 The currently 
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inadequate licensing scheme could be described as “maintaining production 
controls,” which could foreshadow more of the same under a legalization 
framework. But the report’s methods of production control are forward-thinking, 
calling for limits on facility size or growing areas.172 These restrictions would 
have the additional benefit of supporting the development of small-scale, or 
artisanal, farming operations.173 
With respect to environmental concerns, the report endorses outdoor 
agriculture as a more environmentally friendly method of cultivation. “In order to 
limit the environmental impact of the cannabis industry, outdoor production 
should be permitted.”174 Opening the market to outdoor farmers could also help 
diversify the supply chain and support small-scale farmers. Other than this 
measure, however, the report is light on other environmental considerations such 
as water and energy demands, organic certification programs, and pesticide 
regulations. The report’s calls for small-scale cultivation and environmental 
stewardship are important steps in the right direction, but a far cry from the 
statutory or regulatory language that will address these and other pressing 
agricultural issues. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The United States and Canada are both trending toward an end to marijuana 
prohibition. A majority of U.S. states have legalized marijuana for medical use. 
Canada, meanwhile, is expected to introduce legislation to legalize and regulate 
marijuana for recreational use in 2017. And yet, it is clear that both countries are 
navigating the end of the prohibition era in drastically different ways. While the 
U.S. federal government is uninvolved in (and potentially antagonistic toward) 
the legalization movement, the states are flexing their collective political muscles 
in bucking the federal prohibition by adopting their own regulatory frameworks 
for the marijuana industry. Canada, meanwhile, was forced to create a national 
medical marijuana program by a series of judicial decisions. The track record of 
this program—the MMAR, MMPR, and ACMPR—is perhaps underwhelming, 
and reflects the government’s ambivalence toward legalization and regulation. 
But, the current government is now firmly committed to marijuana reform, and a 
comprehensive regulatory framework appears to be on the way. 
These divergent experiences inform the two countries’ approaches to 
marijuana agriculture regulation. Because the U.S. experience has been state-led, 
a diversity of agricultural regulation frameworks has emerged. A few states have 
adopted a hybrid of the Canadian model, in which the state issues licenses to a 
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small number of cultivators so as to maintain control over the supply chain. It is 
unlikely this approach will remain sustainable over the long term as the 
marijuana industry evolves, but it may prove to be an effective training ground 
for state regulators. States with more developed marijuana agriculture industries 
are embracing the participation of larger numbers of cultivators. 
California does not restrict the total number of farms in operation, but places 
limits on the amount of marijuana each farm can grow. The state has also 
decentralized its regulatory powers among various state agencies and local 
governments, so as to take advantage of institutional and local expertise and 
spread the burden of regulation. 
Colorado, by contrast, experimented with vertical integration, an 
organizational framework that proved inefficient, and in many cases, unprofitable 
for cultivators and marijuana businesses. However, Colorado has been willing to 
adapt, abandoning the vertical integration requirement, and adopting various 
environmental protection measures. 
Washington, finally, seeks to separate marijuana businesses into distinct 
categories, hoping to prevent the consolidation of the industry. At the same time, 
regulatory authority over the marijuana industry is concentrated and held by its 
state liquor control board, a choice that simplifies jurisdictional questions while 
at the same time requiring a high degree of sophistication and inter-disciplinarity 
from the agency itself. 
Each of these approaches to marijuana agriculture regulation has its trade-
offs. And, ultimately, what may work in California may not work in Colorado. In 
some ways the marijuana industry’s growth may be facilitated by the U.S. federal 
marijuana prohibition as it forces states to experiment on their own and become 
incubators for new ideas and approaches to agricultural issues. 
Canada, by contrast, has approached marijuana agriculture as a process to be 
tightly controlled. Starting with the MMAR, in which strict limitations were 
placed on personal cultivation, coupled with a government monopoly on larger-
scale production. Although a small sample size, Health Canada’s experience as a 
supplier of marijuana (via government contract with a third party supplier) 
suggests that governments should likely permit the private sector to participate in 
the agricultural process, ideally by supporting the development of many small-
scale and sustainable farmers. 
The MMPR’s shift from government-as-marijuana-supplier to government-
as-marijuana-cultivation-licensor was a welcome shift. However, the devil is in 
the details, and the MMPR’s onerous regulations and licensing application 
process frustrated the expansion of marijuana agriculture in Canada. In addition, 
the law’s indoor cultivation requirement needlessly shut out outdoor farmers who 
could have diversified the supplier base and provided an alternative model to 
compare to. 
It appears the Canadian federal government has turned a corner and is ready 
to fully legalize marijuana for recreational use. While the government’s Task 
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Force report is forward-thinking about several agricultural issues, it is light on 
details. The Parliament and its administrative agencies face a tough task, but past 
experiences, as well as models provided by the many U.S. states now 
experimenting with marijuana agriculture regulation, shine a light on the trade-
offs and considerations regulators and the marijuana industry can expect to face. 
A framework that prioritizes the development of a broadly inclusive 
agricultural community of small and medium-sized farmers, as well as 
environmentally sound agricultural practices, is a regulatory goal that is common 
across frameworks. Involving local governments likewise appears to be a sound 
approach. Otherwise, there are no easy choices as it concerns regulatory 
consolidation vs. decentralization or market integration vs. separation. 
Nonetheless, these choices are better informed by studying and reflecting on the 
experiences of neighboring jurisdictions. No approach is perfect, especially in 
these early days of the legal marijuana industry. But attention to the marijuana 
industry’s most pressing agricultural questions, and how governments are 
answering them, will remain a critical step toward regulatory reform and 
refinement. 
 
